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INTRODUCTION

The nuclear power industry has latched on to global warming as an
argument for its renaissance. Although even industry proponents
acknowledge that the problem of disposing of spent nuclear fuel remains
unsolved, the industry routinely assumes this problem will be solved in
the future. Unfortunately, this is the same assumption made by nuclear
energy proponents at the beginning of the nuclear industry fifty years
ago. We haven’t solved the nuclear waste problem in the past half
century, and there is no reason to think we will be more likely to do so in
the next one. Like the shipwrecked economist in the old joke, the
nuclear industry continues to postulate that we should “assume we have a
can opener” for the nuclear waste problem. 1
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1. See Profession Jokes—Economists, http://www.workjoke.com/projoke44.htm (last
visited Jan. 22, 2008).
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While the impacts of global warming are described as
“intergenerational,” the impacts of the nuclear waste cycle are better
described as inter-civilizational. 2 Nuclear fuel wastes remain hazardous
for hundreds of thousands to as much as a million years. 3 By contrast,
recorded human history goes back only about 5,000 years, and human
civilization is only about 10,000 years old. Globally, none of the
generators of nuclear fuel waste have successfully implemented any
permanent disposal option for nuclear waste, leaving this externality of
nuclear energy production as a problem for future generations, or, more
likely, for future civilizations. Put simply, the nuclear industry, with
government complicity, has transferred and deferred the most expensive
part of the cost of the nuclear fuel cycle to future generations and
civilizations unknown.
Nor are the environmental and public health costs of nuclear waste
the only ones that nuclear energy generation has externalized. Nuclear
generation also poses a risk externality — the economic and social harms
that the public has assumed in the event of a radiation release, for which
the generating industry has limited liability. This risk externality arises
not only from the risk of accidental reactor meltdown and release of
radioactivity, but also from the proliferation and terrorism risks that are
inseparable from any scheme of nuclear energy production and waste
disposal.
These twin externalities, waste and risk, make any nuclear
renaissance an unsatisfactory substitute for fossil fuel power generation.
As horrendous as the impacts of global warming will be — millions of
people displaced and dead — the likely long-term impacts of increased
nuclear energy production are comparable, and longer lasting.
I.

THE EXTERNALITIES OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

The “spent” fuel resulting from nuclear energy production consists
of 97% uranium and 3% other isotopes created by the fission process. 4
These isotopes include Cesium-137, Iodine-129, Cesium-137, and

2. See Karl S. Coplan, The Intercivilizational Inequities of Nuclear Power Weighed
Against the Intergenerational Inequities of Carbon Based Energy, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 227 (2006). This essay is adapted from the article in the Fordham Environmental Law
Review and the author’s presentation at the Fordham Environmental Law Review Symposium
on Climate Change in March, 2006.
3. See Comm’n on Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, Nat’l Res. Council,
TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS 18-19 (1995) (hereinafter NAT’L. RES.
COUNCIL YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPORT), available at
http://newton.nap.edu/books/0309052890/html/2.html.
4. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology, Report to

Congress On Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative: The Future Path for Advanced Spent Fuel
Treatment and Transmutation Research II-2 and Figure II-1 (2003), available at
http://nuclear.gov/pdfFiles/AFCI_CongRpt2003.pdf.
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Plutonium-239. 5 Some of these isotopes have half lives running into the
millions of years, such as Iodine-129, which has a half life of 17 million
years. Plutonimum-239 has a half life of 24,360 years. 6 Dangerous
human exposure can occur by proximity to the spent fuel or by release of
the constituents into the biosphere, resulting in human exposure through
ingestion or respiration. It can also occur by simple proximity to places
where these radionuclides collect.
Currently, there are 55,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel in the
United States. 7 The majority of this fuel is stored in spent fuel pools at
currently operating or decommissioned nuclear power plants. These
spent fuel pools were originally designed to hold spent nuclear fuel only
until it cooled sufficiently to be transported to a permanent disposal site
or reprocessing facility. As no permanent disposal site has opened and
no commercial reprocessing industry has ever developed, these spent fuel
pools store most of the spent fuel generated during the entire history of
nuclear power generation on-site. Several nuclear power plants across
the country, including the Indian Point plant north of New York City,
now experience leaks from these spent fuel pools, releasing dangerous
tritium, cesium, and strontium isotopes into groundwater and the
environment. 8
As these spent fuel pools become full even at higher density
configurations, power plant owners have begun to move spent fuel rods
into “dry cask” storage. These “dry cask” storage containers consist of
concrete and steel cylinders.
According to Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) regulations, the required design life of these dry cask
storage units is only twenty years. 9
Dry cask storage represents a sort of limbo for spent nuclear fuel.
Unfortunately, neither deep geological burial nor reprocessing appear to
be likely solutions to the waste disposal problems, and both pose serious
risks.

5. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19.
6. Id.
7. Lisbeth Gronlund et al., NUCLEAR POWER IN A WARMING WORLD 46 (2007),
available
at
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/solutions/jump.jsp?itemID=35069259.
Although the author disagrees with the report’s conclusion that the expansion of nuclear energy
production is appropriate in the absence of proven solutions to the nuclear waste problem, the
report is an excellent up-to-date summary of the unsolved externalities and risks posed by the
nuclear fuel cycle.
8. Greg Clary, Indian Pt. Leak Sources Found, THE JOURNAL NEWS (WESTCHESTER
COUNTY, N.Y.), Nov. 4, 2005, at 1A.
9. 10 C.F.R. § 72.236(g) (2007); see also U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, STANDARD
REVIEW PLAN FOR DRY CASK STORAGE SYSTEMS, FINAL REPORT (1997), available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1536/.
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THE GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORY NON-SOLUTION

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 directed the Department of
Energy (DOE) to develop, construct, and operate a deep burial
geological waste repository for high level civilian and military nuclear
wastes. 10 In 1987, Congress amended the Act to direct the DOE to focus
on one site: Yucca Mountain in the Nevada desert. 11 Three years ago, the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit undercut the
regulatory basis underlying the Yucca Mountain licensing procedure
when it struck down regulations governing public exposure from the
nuclear waste repository. 12 These regulations only accounted for hazards
associated with waste disposal during the first 10,000 years. The Court
held that the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
should have followed the National Academy of Sciences’s
recommendation to consider risks up to one million years after disposal.
While the DOE currently predicts a 2017 opening for the Yucca
Mountain facility, standards requiring isolation of wastes for a millionyear time frame may preclude the Yucca Mountain site from ever
opening, or at least delay it substantially.
Even if it opens, however, Yucca Mountain will barely have the
capacity to accept all of the civilian nuclear waste that has been generated
and now sits in limbo at nuclear power plant sites, and it will have no
reserve capacity. Based on current rates of nuclear power generation, the
entire civilian nuclear waste capacity of Yucca Mountain will soon be
exceeded. 13 Yucca Mountain is thus not a solution to continued nuclear
energy generation in the United States. Yucca Mountain further
provides no capacity for the expansion of United States nuclear energy
production as an alternative to fossil fuel energy production. Deputy
Energy Secretary Clay Sell has testified that the United States would
require nine repositories the size of Yucca Mountain if nuclear power
generation in this country is to achieve a six-fold increase as a substitute
for fossil fuel power generation. 14
Nor is the United States unique in its political inability to site a longterm geological waste repository. Switzerland and Sweden, which have
also nominally chosen long-term geological waste repositories as the
solution to the nuclear waste problem, have similarly been unable to site
such facilities. 15
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-270 (2000).
11. Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330227.

12. See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (per curiam).
13. See Gronland, supra note 13, at 46.
14. Id. at 71-72.
15. Id. at 45; see also James Kanter, Radioactive Nimby: No One Wants Nuclear Waste,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at H2.
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III. THE REPROCESSING NON-SOLUTION

In theory, the 97% of spent nuclear fuel that consists of uranium
isotopes could be reprocessed, separating the uranium from the
plutonium. The uranium could then be re-enriched and burned again to
generate electricity. Commercially viable reprocessing always has been,
and always will be, the Holy Grail of the nuclear energy industry.
Indeed, commercial reprocessing was the “can opener” that the industry
and governmental regulators assumed we would have at the dawn of the
nuclear energy industry.
Reprocessing poses its own set of political and moral risks and
corresponding externalities. Reprocessing isolates plutonium. Plutonium
is much more poisonous than uranium. Plutonium is also the ideal fuel
for atomic bomb construction; just a few pounds of it in the wrong hands
would allow the construction of a crude atomic weapon.
The only
commercial fuel reprocessing facility ever to operate in the United States,
constructed in West Valley, New York, by Getty Oil Company, never
achieved profitability. Instead, it left behind a $1 billion cleanup bill,
borne by the public, after it closed. 16
India’s use of plutonium from nuclear waste reprocessing to build a
nuclear weapon in the 1970’s and the weapons proliferation risk led
Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford to ban the reprocessing of
spent nuclear fuel into plutonium. 17 This ban has subsequently been
lifted, reinstated, and lifted again.
Current administration policy is to seek the implementation of
reprocessing facilities combined with dedicated plutonium-burning
reactors in order to reduce the amount of nuclear waste requiring longterm disposal while minimizing the proliferation and terrorism risks
associated with separation of plutonium. 18 Fifty years after the dawn of
nuclear energy production, this latest initiative is barely commencing the
research and development phase. There is no proposal to actually site
and construct even one such facility, much less the seventy-five reactors
spread over twenty sites that would be necessary to reprocess waste from
the nation’s existing 104 nuclear power plants. 19 We can expect that
siting even one such facility, meant to accept and reprocess wastes from
multiple nuclear power plants, will prove every bit as politically
problematic as siting a geologic waste repository. Even if such a
reprocessing facility moves from nuclear engineers’ brainstorming
sessions to reality, the DOE has calculated that it would take 100 years of
reprocessing to reduce the amount of transuranic waste requiring disposal
16. See Matthew L. Wald, Big Question Marks on Nuclear Waste Facility, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2006, at C4.
17. See Gronland, supra note 7, at 39.
18. See id. at 39, 68–74.
19. Id. at 50.
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by 50%, at a dollar cost more than twice that of direct disposal of
unreprocessed waste. 20
Nuclear proponents often point to France as an example of a nation
that has “solved” its nuclear waste disposal problem through
reprocessing. On closer examination, however, while France has been
successful in reprocessing nuclear waste, it has not found a means of
recycling either the reprocessed uranium or the separated plutonium
resulting from reprocessing. As a result, France has an inventory of
thousands of tons of reprocessed uranium for which there is no
commercial use, and 50 tons of separated plutonium. 21 The plutonium
stockpile poses the quintessential problem of reprocessing: just nine
pounds of separated plutonium is sufficient to make a crude nuclear
bomb. 22
The unseparated nuclear waste is not suitable bomb-making
material, and is sufficiently radioactive to make it impossible to handle
without highly specialized reprocessing facilities (unshielded, fresh spent
fuel will cause a lethal exposure within an hour). 23 Once separated,
however, the plutonium is sufficiently less radioactive that a terrorist
willing to risk long-term health impacts could fashion a crude nuclear
weapon with no more protection than a dust mask to prevent inhalation
of plutonium dust. 24 Diversion of just one ten-thousandth of France’s
fifty-ton plutonium stockpile would allow terrorists to fashion a portable
nuclear weapon. Keeping plutonium out of the wrong hands assumes
perfect security and accounting for the separated plutonium indefinitely.
Fifty years into the nuclear era, neither reprocessing nor geologic
disposal have overcome the basic engineering, economic, security and
political obstacles to their implementation. Yet the nuclear energy
industry enjoys the economic advantage of collecting electricity rates
while shifting the entire economic uncertainty of the as yet unsolved
problem of waste disposal to the federal government. Pursuant to the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, nuclear power producers were
assessed a tax of 0.1 cents per kilowatt hour of electricity generated, and
in exchange, the DOE was obligated to accept and dispose of all nuclear
waste generated by these plants. 25 Several nuclear generators have
successfully sued DOE for failing to take nuclear wastes by 1998 as

20. Id. at 73, nn.185–97 (citing Matthew Crozat, Evaluating the Economics of GNEP
Deployment, DOE, pre-decisional draft (January 8, 2007)).
21. Gronland, supra note 7, at 51.
22. See Global Security: Nuclear Terrorism,
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
23. Gronland, supra note 7, at 43.
24. Id. at 44.
25. Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982).
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contemplated. 26 Thus, for a minimal payment, the economic cost of
waste disposal has been externalized by the industry.
IV. THE NUCLEAR RISK EXTERNALITY

As with the costs of waste disposal, the costs and consequences of
the risk of catastrophic nuclear accident or terrorist attack have been
shifted from the industry to the public. Under the Price-Anderson Act,
individual power plant liability for a nuclear mishap is limited to $300
million, while the joint liability of the industry is limited to a total of $10
billion. 27 This liability limit falls far short of the potential damages
associated with a severe reactor accident. A 2004 study commissioned by
the Riverkeeper organization estimated that damages caused by a severe
reactor or spent fuel accident at the Indian Point nuclear power plant, 35
miles north of New York City, would exceed $2 trillion in property
damage, in addition to 44,000 short-term fatalities and 518,000 latent
long-term fatalities. 28 The NRC itself, in a 1982 report, similarly
estimated the consequences of a severe reactor accident to include 46,000
early fatalities, 13,000 cancer deaths, and $274 billion in property damage
(in 1982 dollars). 29
This risk externality has three components: the risk of release of
radioactivity due to an accident or malfunction at nuclear power plant,
the risk of a release of radioactivity due to terrorist attack, and the risk of
nuclear weapons proliferation unavoidably associated with the nuclear
fuel enrichment and reprocessing cycle. The value of this “risk subsidy”
to the nuclear industry has been estimated as high as thirty cents per
kilowatt hour. 30

26. See, e.g., PSEG Nuclear, L.L.C. v. United States, 465 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Maine
Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336, 1337-40 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 211 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Indiana Mich. Power Co.
v. US. Dep’t of Energy, 88 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also DOE Backs Interim Storage
Without Wavering On Yucca's Future, ENERGYWASHINGTON WEEK, Dec. 13, 2006 (reporting
that DOE's potential liability in lawsuits exceeds the amount available in the Nuclear Waste
Fund).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (2000); see also U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, Fact Sheet on Nuclear
Insurance and Disaster Relief Funds, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/factsheets/funds-fs.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
28. EDWIN S. LYMAN, RIVERKEEPER, INC., CHERNOBYL ON THE HUDSON? THE HEALTH
AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AT THE INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT (2004), available at http://riverkeeper.org/document.php/317/Chernobyl_on_th.pdf.
29. Data from Sandia Labs and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 1982 “Calculation
of Reactor Accident Consequences” report (commonly referred to as the “CRAC-2 Report”)
are reprinted at Mothersalert, Impact of a Meltdown at Nuclear Plant,
http://www.geocities.com/mothersalert/crac.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
30. Anthony Heyes, Determining the Price of Price-Anderson, REGULATION, Winter 2003,
at 26, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv25n4/v25n4-8.pdf.
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A. Accident Risk
As the incidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island have
demonstrated, the operation of nuclear power plants entails a risk of
malfunctions that could potentially lead to core meltdown and
atmospheric release of radioactivity
These two incidents are
comfortably in the past, but as recently as 2002, undiscovered
deterioration of the reactor vessel head at the Davis-Besse nuclear power
plant in Ohio brought that facility within weeks of a core meltdown
event, 31 and this past year, an earthquake ruptured pipes and led to the
release of radioactive contamination at Japan’s Kashiwazaki plant. 32
As it turns out, even based on industry reliability estimates, the
operation of hundreds of nuclear power plants domestically and
thousands of nuclear power plants internationally is statistically certain to
result in more severe accidents in the mid-term. According to industry
estimates, a severe nuclear power accident can be expected to occur less
frequently than once every 10,000 reactor-years.33 While this number
sounds comfortably large, this translates into one severe accident every
one hundred years for the 104 currently operating nuclear power plants in
the United States, or one severe accident every twenty-five years if the
number of operating reactors is quadrupled to reduce the global warming
impacts of electricity generation. Since the NRC has not required the
next generation of nuclear power plants to be any safer than the existing
power plants, 34 the expected accident rate is not likely to change. Even in
the mid-term, a severe nuclear accident is a likelihood if we increase
nuclear power production enough to make a substantial dent in our
greenhouse gas emissions.

B.

Terrorism Risk

The industry’s 1-in-10,000 reactor-years estimate of the likelihood of
severe reactor incidents is based only on the likelihood of accidental
mechanical or operational mishap. It does not take into account the
probability of a successful terrorist attack on an operating nuclear power
plant or its spent fuel pools. Following the September 11 attacks, the
31. See Gronlund, supra note 7, at 17.
32. Martin Fackler, Japan Nuclear Site Damage Worse than Reported, N.Y. TIMES, July
19, 2007, at A8.
33. MARK HOLT, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY, 7
(Updated Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://www.iags.org/CRS_IB88090.pdf. The NRC refers to
a “severe accident” as “beyond the substantial coverage of design basis events,” and one that
“constitute[s] the major risk to the public associated with radioactive releases from nuclear
power plant accidents.” Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Policy Statement on Severe Reactor
Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants, 50 Fed. Reg. 32138 (Aug. 8, 1985) (to
be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50).
34. Gronland, supra note 7, at 53–54, Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants:
Statement of Policy, 51 FR 24643 (July 8, 1986).
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National Academy of Sciences assessed the nation’s vulnerabilities and
concluded that “the potential for a September 11th-style surprise attack
in the near term using U.S. assets, such as airplanes, appears to be
high.” 35 Remarkably, the NRC takes no account of these risks in
licensing and other regulatory decisions concerning nuclear power
plants. 36 NRC regulations specifically provide that a licensee “is not
required to provide for design features or other measures for the specific
purpose of protection against the effects of . . . attacks and destructive
acts, including sabotage, directed against the facility by an enemy of the
United States, whether a foreign government or other person . . . .” 37
NRC has reaffirmed this position repeatedly since the September 11
attacks, 38 most recently when it announced that it would not follow a
Ninth Circuit decision requiring it to consider the potential of terrorist
attacks during environmental review of nuclear facility licenses and
renewals under the National Environmental Policy Act. 39
While nuclear proponents claim that nuclear containment structures
are robust structures that might survive a September 11-style aircraft
impact, this argument ignores the fact that spent fuel pools—which
contain a larger radioactive inventory than the active reactor core—are
outside of the containment structure. This spent fuel is susceptible to a
zirconium cladding fire in the event the pools were drained rapidly, an
event that the NRC considered to be a likely consequence of a crash of a
commercial jetliner into a spent fuel pool structure. 40 Similarly, there are
other critical operational structures located outside the containment
dome, destruction of which would cause loss of reactor control. 41
Like the risk of accidental radioactive release, the risk of a sabotage
or terrorist induced core meltdown at a nuclear power plant is one that is
35. COMM. ON SCI. AND TECH. FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL,
MAKING THE NATION SAFER: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING
TERRORISM 50 (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/stct/index.html.
36. See Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 869 F.2d 719 (3d
Cir. 1989); see also City of New York v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983); Final
Rule, Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, 63 Fed.
Reg. 26955, 955-56 (May 15, 1998).
37. 10 C.F.R. § 50.13 (2008).
38. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002); see also Duke Energy Corp., 56
N.R.C. 358 (2002).
39. Amergen Energy Co., LLC, 65 N.R.C. 124 (2007) (declining to follow San Luis Obispo
Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006), cert denied sub nom. PG&E v. San
Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, 127 S. Ct. 1124, 166 L. Ed. 2d 891 (2007)). Although the NRC
revised the “Design Basis Threat” that nuclear power plants are required to plan for, ostensibly
to respond to the heightened threat environment since September 11, this new design basis
threat (details of which remain classified) still fails to reflect the level of force and coordination
reflected in the September 11 attacks themselves. See Gronland, supra note 7, at 4.
40. Gronland, supra note 7, at 34; see also NATI’L RES. COUNCIL, TECHNICAL STUDY OF
SPENT FUEL POOL ACCIDENT RISK AT DECOMMISSIONING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 3–23
(2000).
41. Gronland, supra note 7, at 34.
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borne by the public and one for which the nuclear generating industry has
no responsibility either to defend against or to compensate for beyond
the minimal limits of Price-Anderson.

C.

Proliferation Risk

The nuclear fuel cycle poses two nuclear weapons proliferation risks:
enrichment technology and plutonium production. First, the technology
and facilities needed to enrich uranium fuel to make it suitable for energy
production are identical to the technology and facilities that can be used
further to enrich uranium to the point that it is suitable bomb-making
material. This means that spreading nuclear fuel generation technology
also spreads nuclear weapons technology. While the nuclear nonproliferation treaty prohibits signatories other than the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China from converting nuclear
energy technologies to weapons use, a nation that withdraws from the
treaty can rapidly convert the technology to bomb production.
Second, and perhaps more hazardous in the short term, is the
amount of weapons-grade plutonium necessarily created by reprocessing
nuclear waste. As noted above, keeping this material out of the hands of
terrorist organizations assumes perfect security and accounting for this
plutonium, while diversion of just a few kilograms is sufficient to fashion
a nuclear bomb. 42
If nuclear power is to be a permanent replacement for fossil fuels,
then diversion of technology or plutonium to hostile use is likely in the
long run. Ironically, the political upheavals and geopolitical tensions that
are likely to result from global warming may actually make nuclear
weapons proliferation from expanded nuclear energy generation and
hostile use of nuclear weapons more likely. 43
V.

OTHER NUCLEAR POWER EXTERNALITIES

While I have focused this discussion on the two largest and least
conventional externalities of nuclear power generation, nuclear power
generation involves other environmental externalities as well. The most
significant of these are the aquatic impacts associated with cooling water
withdrawals and heat discharges common to most steam electric
generating facilities. According to the EPA, aquatic impacts from even
one facility can be staggering: “impingement and entrainment at
individual facilities may result in appreciable losses of early life stages of
42. Id. at 42.
43. In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, Chairman R.K. Pachauiri warned that international conflict is one
likely consequence of global warming. See R. K. Pachauri, Chairman, Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), Nobel Lecture at Oslo (Dec. 10, 2007) (available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/ipcc-lecture_en.html).

2008]

EXTERNALITIES OF NUCLEAR POWER

27

fish and shellfish (e.g., three to four billion individuals annually . . . ,
serious reductions in forage species and recreational and commercial
landings (e.g., 23 tons lost per year . . .), and extensive losses over
relatively short intervals of time (e.g., one million fish lost during a threeweek study period).” 44 These impacts can be largely eliminated through
the implementation of closed cycle cooling systems.
Nor is the nuclear fuel cycle entirely without its own contribution to
greenhouse gas emissions, as fossil fuel energy is used in the mining,
transportation and enrichment phases of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Nevertheless, these greenhouse gas emissions are relatively modest,
comparable to the emissions associated with wind or hydroelectric power,
and less than the emissions associated with construction of photovoltaic
panels. 45
VI. WHO WILL PAY FOR THESE EXTERNALITIES?

So, without any operating reprocessing cycle or geological
repository, nuclear waste and its byproducts continue to pile up, primarily
at the location of nuclear power generation facilities in this country, and
at reprocessing facilities in other countries. In this country, this waste is
being moved from spent fuel pools packed well beyond their original
design capacity into dry cask storage units that, by regulation, have a
design life of twenty years. 46 Yet there is no facility in the works that will
be available in twenty years to accept these wastes for treatment or longterm geological disposal, just as there still is no facility to accept the waste
generated from the past forty years of nuclear power generation.
Fiscal responsibility for nuclear wastes has been assumed by the
federal government, but the bill is likely to come due at the same time as
the global economic system grapples with the dislocations caused by
several deferred costs of the unprecedented current global and national
economic prosperity. These include the end of cheap transportation and
energy provided by an unsustainable carbon fuel cycle in addition to the
many other adaptations to climate change that will have to be made.
The fact is that no political or economic system can assure the
security or integrity of waste for a period of time even remotely
approaching the time period during which waste poses extreme health,
environmental, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation risks. To put the
24,000 year half life of plutonium in context, keep in mind that recorded
human history has lasted for only 5,000 years. China, the world’s oldest
44. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: Regulations Addressing Cooling
Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, Final Rule, 66 F.R. 65256-01 (Dec. 18, 2001) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. 9, 122-125).
45. Gronland, supra note 7, at 11.
46. 10 C.F.R. § 72.236(g) (2008); see also U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, STANDARD
REVIEW PLAN FOR DRY CASK STORAGE SYSTEMS, FINAL REPORT (1997), available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1536/.
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continuous civilization is 10,000 years old. Thirty thousand years ago,
neanderthals still populated the European continent. In that time period,
the continental glaciers of the Wisconsin age have advanced and
retreated, covering and uncovering and grinding to dust many of the
locations of currently operating nuclear power plants and their waste
piles.
If the past is any prediction of the future, the nuclear waste we are
now taking from storage pools and placing in casks will outlast our
political system. Many of these disposal locations are located in major
metropolitan areas: over 161 million people currently live within 75 miles
of a nuclear power plant. Each spent fuel inventory contains enough
radionuclides that if widely dispersed would render thousands of square
miles uninhabitable. 47 Dispersal might occur by sea level rise inundating
coastal locations, by spent fuel pool fires lofting aerosols, or by terrorist
attack. The populations impacted by such dispersal—over ten million
people in the New York metropolitan area potentially impacted by either
the Indian Point nuclear power plants or by the Oyster Creek nuclear
power plants in New Jersey—are comparable to the populations that will
be impacted by global sea level rise. The city subject to a possible nuclear
terrorist attack from unaccounted-for plutonium would be subject to
casualties on a similar order of magnitude.
Nuclear power might nonetheless have a role to play in mitigating
global climate change by displacing carbon cycle energy. If such a role is
to be any less disastrous to future generations (and civilizations) than the
carbon fuel cycle, then continuation and expansion of nuclear energy
production should be contingent on the proven availability of existing
facilities for geological disposal or a proven and commercially viable fuel
reprocessing system. If we plan for the future of the planet to depend on
canned goods, then we should first have an operable can opener.

47. See Declaration of 7 December 2001 by Dr. Gordon Thompson in Support of a Petition
by Riverkeeper, Inc., Energy Corporation, 53 N.R.C. 488 (2001), available at
http://riverkeeper.org/document.php/41/Thompson_Declar.doc.

